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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 

















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ=======- 354 - 
=
=
Summary of Echoes across the Pond: Understanding EU-US 
Defense Industrial Relationships 
Presenter: Raymond (Chip) Franck, PhD, Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Business & Public 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, retired from the Air Force in 2000 in the grade of Brigadier General 
after 33 years commissioned service.  He served in a number of operational tours as a bomber pilot; staff 
positions—which included the Office of Secretary of Defense and Headquarters, Strategic Air Command; 
and was Professor and Head, Department of Economics and Geography at the US Air Force Academy.  
His institutional responsibilities at NPS have included the interim chairmanship of the newly formed 
Systems Engineering Department from July 2002 to September 2004, teaching a variety of economics 
courses and serving on a number of committees to revise curricula for both the Management and 
Systems Engineering disciplines.  His research agenda focuses on defense acquisition practices and 
military innovation. 
Raymond (Chip) Franck 
Senior Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-3614 
E-mail: refranck@nps.edu  
Author: Ira Lewis, PhD, is Associate Professor of Logistics, Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  His interests include transportation, public policy, and 
the impact of information technology on logistics. 
Ira A. Lewis 
Associate Professor 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-2464 
E-mail: ialewis@nps.edu   
Author: Bernard Udis, PhD, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Colorado at Boulder 
and Visiting Research Professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey.  He has also served 
as Distinguished Visiting Professor of Economics at the US Air Force Academy, and as William C. Foster 
Fellow at the US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency.  His NATO Research Fellowship examined the 
costs and benefits of offsets in defense trade.   
Professor Udis' published work includes three books: The Economic Consequences of Reduced Military 
Spending (editor, 1973), From Guns to Butter: Technology Organizations and Reduced Military Spending 
in Western Europe (1978), and The Challenge To European Industrial Policy: Impacts of Redirected 
Military Spending (1987).  In addition, he has published numerous articles in scholarly journals on 
defense industries and military power.  These include "Offsets as Industrial Policy: Lessons from 
Aerospace" (with Keith Maskus, 1992), and "New Challenges to Arms Export Control: Whither 
Wassenaar?" (with Ron Smith, 2001).  A number of his works are considered classics in defense 
economics and have been reprinted in collections such as The Economics of Defence (Todd Sandler & 
Keith Hartley, 2001) and ARMS TRADE, SECURITY AND CONFLICT (Paul Levine & Ron Smith, 2003). 
Professor Udis' current research focuses upon competition and cooperation in the aerospace industries of 









Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
13 Camino Real 






This report represents the authors’ efforts to provide a useful, albeit partial, 
understanding of the international defense marketplace—which we view as growing increasingly 
complex.  In pursuit of that objective, we provide a brief overview of international defense 
markets in the context of both changes in military affairs and the various defense industrial 
bases.   
In analyzing the defense market, we essay multiple analytical frameworks (along the 
lines of Essence of Decision).  Our analytical models are: (a) a sophisticated view of offsets in a 
public policy context with market imperfections, (b) transaction cost economics, with our unit of 
analysis being the nation-state instead of the firm, and (c) two standard corporate strategy 
models. 
To test the models’ explanatory powers, we consider three ongoing “cases”: F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter, the UK Defense Industrial Strategy, and the Northrop-Grumman-EADS KC-30 
proposal.  Interestingly, we find all three hypotheses have some explanatory power, but none of 
the three is demonstrably better than the others (in this small sample).  
Summary 
This is a summary of the report cited above for inclusion in the Proceedings of the Fifth 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Annual Acquisition Symposium (2008, May).  (The report itself 
greatly exceeds the length guidelines for the Proceedings.  The topics raised here are 
discussed in greater detail within the body of that report.) 
The motivation for this particular project was our conviction that standard explanatory 
paradigms for understanding global defense trade, e.g., offsets and related subjects, have been 
strained—perhaps to the breaking point.  Accordingly, we hypothesized that analysis of this 
increasingly complex market system would be improved by the application of multiple models 
(as was done by Graham Allison in Essence of Decision). 
Section I is a brief introduction. 
Section II is an interpretative discussion of ongoing developments in the international 
defense market place.  In this section, we discuss the following. 
 A. Military Affairs.  There are two ongoing Revolutions in Military Affairs—one lead by the 
US DoD, the other by contemporary terrorist and insurgency movements.  Accordingly, 
the international defense market has been significantly affected by the ongoing 
competition between between two groups that are deliberately engaged in processes of 
rapid military innovation (both underpinned by contemporary information technology). 
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 B. Developments in the Global Defense Marketplace (in general)—including acquisition 
reform and the globalization of defense industrial production.  We noted in particular the 
systemic tension between globalization and national sovereignty—an issue that’s 
especially acute for defense-related goods. 
 C. US and EU Defense Industrial Developments (in particular).  These include the role of 
US and European defense firms in the world market, recent trends in defense budgets, 
and patterns of reorganization (generally consolidation).  We noted the dangers of 
relying solely on detailed quantitative analysis to analyze a complex and changing 
system in the absence of well-defined analytic paradigms. 
Section III presents multiple analytical frameworks as a basis for the analysis of complex 
systems.  We then present our three paradigms. 
 A. We first summarize Allison’s use of multiple analytical frameworks. 
 B.  Offsets and International Industrial Participation.  We hypothesize that although the 
offsets perspective was not able to offer comprehensive understanding of the 
international defense market, we believe it still has explanatory power (and are, in any 
case, obliged to assess its usefulness).   
 C. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE): TCE was originally developed to study vertical 
boundaries of firms (the make-or-buy decision in particular).  We summarize the relevant 
considerations for that decision.  We expand the standard TCE model somewhat and 
consider the nation-state as a military enterprise.  (One would then view a decision to 
buy military equipment as a decision to import—as opposed to a decision to rely on 
domestic sources.) 
 D. Corporate Strategy: Finally, we introduce two standard models of corporate strategy: 
Five Forces (Porter, 1980) and “Co-opetition” (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996).   
Section IV provides narratives of three ongoing “cases”: the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), 
the UK Defense Industrial Strategy, and the KC-30 Proposal.  For all three cases, we provide an 
interpretive narrative (up to report publication) and then provide explanations based on the three 
frameworks (from Section III). 
Joint Strike Fighter  
Offsets: The JSF seems structured to operate in an offsets-free model.  Among other 
things, the JSF consortium is intended to change foreign military sales customers to 
stakeholders (who share both in risks and rewards).  This arrangement, in turn, is 
intended to drive the consortium’s focus toward productive efficiency rather than the side 
payments negotiated in offset agreements.  The viewpoints of the JSF stakeholders 
(expressed in anonymous interviews) is not fully consistent with that objective. 
Transaction Cost Economics: From the prime contracting firm’s perspective, 
international trade in defense goods frequently involves the formation of long-term 
relations—the consequences of which are one of the main concerns of the TCE 
literature.  The JSF strategy is, in a very real sense, intended to delay the “fundamental 
transformation” from competitive market to something similar to bilateral monopoly. 
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Corporate Strategy: The JSF model addresses every defense industrial firm’s concern 
with buyer power—sovereign entities in this case.  The aim is to mitigate this threat to 
profits by recruiting stakeholders who are well placed to influence the sovereign buyers’ 
behavior—in this case, domestic defense firms in a number of countries. 
UK Defense Industrial Strategy (DIS) 
Offsets: Taken at face value, the DIS is intended for a post-offsets trading regime.  
However, a more in-depth reading reveals a careful preparation for negotiations over 
industrial participation (as tacit offsets).  For example, the DIS identifies core industries 
in which there must be domestic defense participation. 
Transaction Cost Economics: One of the major purposes of the DIS is protection from 
the costs and risks associated with outsourcing (importing) major portions of the UK’s 
defense equipment.  From this perspective, there are many serious areas of concern 
associated with importing modern defense systems.  The DIS’ insistence upon 
“appropriate sovereignty” in the lifecycle management (and operational use) of this 
imported equipment is a serious effort to manage and mitigate those risks. 
Corporate Strategy: The contemporary defense marketplace poses significant threats to 
the profits (and, therefore, viability) of the British defense industrial base.  The DIS first 
reserves certain categories of defense products to domestic firms.  It also insists upon 
the ability to upgrade, modify and generally manage defense systems throughout their 
operational life.  This is well understood as a strategy for mitigating (foreign) supplier 
power. 
KC-30 Proposal 
Stealthy Offsets: The details of the KC-30 proposal, which included provisions for 
extensive US industrial participation, were really intended to insert offsets into a proposal 
to a customer who ostensibly did not engage in offset agreements.  The evolution of the 
KC-30’s industrial participation component is best understood as a tacit negotiation over 
offsets. 
Corporate Strategy: Standard models of corporate strategy clearly reveal the rationale 
for EADS’ entry to the US defense market—with a view to changing its environment by 
redefining its market niche.  The USAF’s KC-X project provided EADS with a high 
degree of market power relative to both its rival and its prospective buyer.  The buyer 
(the US government) insisted upon competition, with EADS being the only reasonable 
competitor other than Boeing.  Hence, the success of the KC-30 in the initial Air Force 
source-selection process is the result of a very well-crafted corporate strategy 
(regardless of final outcome). 
Transaction Cost Economics: The risks the US would assume in choosing the KC-30 
include an international politics of a “holdup”—denying support to KC-30s in US military 
operations because of source-country disapproval.  Hence, the partnership with 
Northrop-Grumman and extensive KC-30 production work located in the US are readily 
understandable as means to assure the US government that such risks are not serious.   
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Basically, we found support for our hypothesis about the international defense market 
being an increasingly complex system, the study of which usefully involves the application of 
multiple analytical frameworks.   
We conclude, first, that all three of our perspectives have explanatory power in all three 
cases considered.  Second, and also interesting, is that relative explanatory power varied over 
this small sample.  We concluded that the offsets paradigm was best for understanding the Joint 
Strike Fighter project; that TCE did best for the UK’s DIS; and corporate strategy models 
provided especially good insights into the KC-30 proposal. 
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